






*Address: Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH
43210; Email: evans21@osu.edu; Phone: 614-292-0072; Fax: 614-292-3906.
I thank Kei- Mu  Yi, Eric van  Wincoop, and Gregory Hess for helpful
comments.2
1. Introduction
My purpose in this paper is to investigate the dynamics of per capita income in the
regions of a given country and, to a lesser extent, in the countries of the world. A key
question that I seek to answer is whether the per capita incomes of the regions or
countries tend to converge toward parallel balanced growth paths. If an affirmative
answer appears to be reasonable, I shall then seek to estimate how rapidly this
convergence takes place, how far apart the balanced growth paths are, and what variables
determine how high the balanced growth paths are.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the implications of
growth theory and the answers that the recent empirical growth literature has provided to
these questions. It also explains why these answers cannot be given much credence.
Section 3 argues that the income dynamics of the regions of a country may be
qualitatively different from those for the countries of the world. In particular, per capita
incomes could converge toward parallel balanced growth paths for the former while
diverging for the latter. Furthermore, to the extent that labor mobility is quantitatively
important across a collection of regions within some country, convergence is likely to be
much more rapid for them than for countries of the world among which labor mobility is
negligible. Section 5 presents empirical results for the 48 contiguous US states. It is
hoped that these results can indicate what one might expect to observe for countries at
some future date when factors are as mobile across countries as they are now across the
states. Section 6 compares these empirical findings with some obtained for a sample of
countries. Finally, section 7 offers a few conclusions.
2. Review of the Literature
Robert Solow (1956), David Cass (1965), and  Tjalling Koopmans (1965)  inter alios
formulated neoclassical growth theories in which production functions are characterized
by diminishing returns to labor and reproducible factors separately and constant returns to
them jointly. As a result, their models predict that per capita income can grow in the long
run only if exogenous technological improvement keeps the efficiency of labor growing.
On the assumption that the efficiency of labor grows at a constant rate, per capita income3
converges to a unique balanced growth path in their models. In other words, if per capita
income is below (above) its level on the balanced growth path, it grows more (less)
rapidly than along the balanced growth path. Their models also predict that the height of
the balanced growth path toward which per capita income converges is higher, the
thriftier and less fertile are the inhabitants of the economy and the more productively they
use their resources.
Applying this model to national economies is straightforward on the assumption
that factors do not move across national frontiers and countries are identical except for
their initial conditions. Given these strong assumptions, neoclassical growth theories
predict that countries with high per capita incomes grow more slowly than countries with
low per capita incomes. These predictions, however, are grossly inconsistent with the
historical experience since 1820. According to Angus  Maddison (1995, p. 22), the
world’s richest country in 1820 had three times the per capita income of the poorest
country for which data are available. That ratio rose to 7 in 1870, 11 in 1913, 35 in 1950,
40 in 1973, and 72 in 1992. Table 1 reports his estimates of per capita income for seven
country groups over the period 1820-1992, and Table 2 reports growth rates calculated
from them. Before 1950, richer groups tended also to grow more rapidly. Only since
1950 has any tendency for rich countries to grow more slowly than poor countries been
evident. Even that tendency is confined mostly to Western and Southern Europe and
Asia; Latin America and especially Africa have continued to lose ground in relative
terms. For large samples of countries over the period since 1960, the correlation between
growth rates and initial levels of per capita income is positive; see Robert Barro (1997).
Maddison (p. 20) estimates that world per capita income grew 1.21 percent a year
between 1820 and 1992. Growth that rapid is unprecedented in world history and
prehistory; see David  Landes (1998). Indeed, growth in the previous 10,000 years could
not have been even as high as 0.04 percent a year,  Maddison’s estimate for 1500-1820.
The reason is that world per capita income would have had to start at only $10 a year in
order to have grown to  Maddison’s estimate of $565 a year in 1500. Neoclassical growth
theory has nothing useful to say about this enormous increase in the growth rate. Nor
does it appear to explain why growth rates since 1820 have differed across groups of
countries for long periods.4
To overcome these shortcomings of neoclassical growth theory, Paul Romer
(1986, 1990), Robert Lucas (1988), and Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992)  inter
alios formulated growth theories that endogenize the steady-state growth rate. Their
models essentially replace the assumption of constant returns to all factors and
diminishing returns to reproducible factors with the assumption of increasing returns to
all factors and constant returns to reproducible factors. These theories, however, also
proved to have counterfactual implications. In particular, they imply that growth rates
should be highly persistent, rising or falling with investment rates, shares of employment
in R&D, and the size and schooling of the population  inter alia. In fact, growth rates of
individual countries evidence little persistence notwithstanding the great persistence in
their presumed determinants; see William Easterly, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett and
Lawrence Summers (1993), Charles Jones (1995), and my 1997a paper. As a result, a
consensus has been emerging that theories of endogenous growth are useful primarily for
understanding why the world as a whole and countries at the technological frontier can
grow in the long run;
1 see Barro (1997, pp. ix- xii, 1-8). Properly used, neoclassical
growth theory can then explain cross-country differences in per capita income. Using it
properly, however, entails recognizing that technology only gradually diffuses across
countries and that countries do differ in more that merely initial conditions. See  Landes
for a rich account of the many ways in which countries differ.
A large literature has used cross-country data in order  to investigate the
determinants of how high a given country’s balanced growth path is and how rapidly it
approaches this path. (Barro, 1997, provides a useful review of this literature.) The basic
econometric framework in this literature is the partial-adjustment model
(1) Dy y y c c c = + - < <
* g h h ( ), ,
0 0 1
where  Dyc is the average growth rate of per capita income over some extended period of
time for country  c, yc
*  is the steady-state value of the logarithm of per capita income for
country  c at the beginning of the period,  yc
0  is its actual value,  g is the mean growth rate
of the steady-state value of per capita income for the world as a whole and for each
                                                           
1 Narayana R.  Kocherlakota and Kei- Mu  Yi (1997) report evidence of endogenous growth for the United
States and the United Kingdom. One interpretation of their finding is that during at least part of each
country’s sample period, it was the technological leader.5
country, and  h is the rate at which adjustment occurs. On the assumption that  yc
*  is
linearly related to a vector  xc of variables and an error term, equation (1) then implies that
(2) Dy x y c c c c = + ¢ - + a b h x
0 ,
where  a is a parameter,  b is a vector of parameters, and  xc is an error term that is
supposed to have a zero mean, a constant variance, and to be uncorrelated across
countries. The parameter  h measures the rate at which each country converges toward its
balanced growth path, accounting not only for the accumulation of reproducible factors
but also for the diffusion of technology across countries. Each entry of the parameter
vector  b equals the product of  h and the effect of the corresponding entry of  xc on the
height of country  c’s balanced growth path. Therefore, from knowledge of  b and  h, one
can calculate the effect of  xc on the height of the balanced growth path and hence its
unconditional effect on the logarithm of per capita income. Furthermore, one can
calculate its predicted effect on the average growth rate  Dyc, conditional on a fixed initial
value for per capita income. Unconditionally, however,  xc does not affect country  c’s
growth rate, whose steady-state value  g is exogenous.
This literature reports highly significantly positive estimates of  h, which imply
convergence toward the balanced growth paths for per capita income of two or three
percent a year.
2 Furthermore, these balanced growth paths are estimated to be
significantly higher, the more favorable the country’s investment climate is, the more
educated its population is, and the lower its fertility rate is. As a result, if equation (2)
were correctly specified, neoclassical growth theory would receive strong support as a
theory of cross-country differences in per capita income.
Unfortunately, equation (2) is likely to be misspecified in empirically important
ways. Simultaneity is probably its worst problem. If  h > 0, equation (2) explains the
unconditional level of  yc along its balanced growth path as well as the conditional growth
rate over the period during which  Dyc is measured. As a result, the same simultaneity
problem arises from fitting equation (2) as would arise from regressing  yc
0  directly on  xc;
namely, both are biased if per capita income affects any of the variables in  xc. It would be
                                                           
2 Barro reports that the convergence rate can be a high as six percent a year for countries with highly
educated populations.6
astonishing, however, if countries with exogenously higher balanced growth paths did not
also choose to educate their populations more, to have fewer children per (more educated,
higher-wage) female, and perhaps to have a more favorable climate for investment as
well. Furthermore, lagging the variables in  xc is unlikely to help since doing so need not
attenuate cross-sectional correlation. For example, educational attainments in 1960, 1975,
and 1990 are all likely to be well correlated with the exogenous component of the height
of the balanced growth path for per capita income between 1960 and 1990. Finally,
finding instrumental variables that are well correlated with the variables in  xc but are not
themselves affected by per capita income is a daunting task. Simply lagging the
determinants, as is often done in the literature, serves no useful purpose.
A second problem arises because countries with exogenously higher balanced
growth paths tend also to have higher initial per capita incomes. As a result,  yc
0  is
positively correlated with the error term  xc even if  xc is not, biasing the estimates of  h and
b toward zero. For example, my 1997b paper shows that even if  xc can account for 90
percent of the variance in the heights of the balanced growth paths for  yc, the probability
limit of the estimator of  h is about ½ h.
A third problem results from the enormous heterogeneity of countries. This
heterogeneity makes the assumption that the parameters of equation (2) are identical
across countries simply incredible. In estimating static cross-sectional regressions like
those estimated in section 4, it might be reasonable to make this assumption. The reason
is that ordinary least squares consistently  estimates a weighted average of these
parameters under the standard orthogonality restriction on  xt. By contrast, in estimating
dynamics, incorrectly assuming identical parameters can result in serious biases and
should probably be avoided at all cost; see Kyung So  Im,  Hashem Pesaran, and
Yongcheol Shin (1995).
An alternative to the cross-sectional approach considered above emphasizes the
time-series implications of the stock-adjustment model (1). Suppose that only cross-
sectional data are available on  xc, the vector of variables useful in explaining the height of
country  c’s balanced growth path for per capita income. In that case, model (1) implies
that7
(3) Dy d y ct c c c t t ct = - - + - - h t z ( ) , 1 1 ;
where  yct is the logarithm of per capita income for country  c in period  t; dc is a parameter
that incorporates the country-specific component of  yct
* , including that explained by  xc; tt
is the time-specific component of  yct
*  (i.e., the common trend of the  y
* s); and  zct is a
stationary error term with a zero mean and finite variance. I give  c subscripts to the
parameters  dc and  hc in order to allow for cross-country heterogeneity. This unobservable
common trend  tt can be eliminated from equation (3) by averaging equation (3) across
the countries and subtracting each member of the resulting equation from the
corresponding member of equation (3). The result is
(4) D( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , y y d d y y ct t c c c t t ct t - = - - - + - - - h z z 1 1
where  yt , d , and  z t  are the cross-country means of  yct, dc, and  z ct . Because  z z ct t -
may be serially correlated, one would implement equation (4) empirically in the form
(5) D D ( ) ( ) ( ) , , y y y y y y u ct t c c c t t ci c t i t i ct
i
p
- = + - + - + - - - -
= ￿ d r f 1 1
1
,
where  rc is a parameter that is zero or negative depending on whether  hc is zero or
positive,  dc is a parameter with the same sign as  d d c - , f f f c c cp 1 2 , , , L  are parameters
arising from the serial correlation of  z z ct t - , and uct is a serially uncorrelated error term
with a zero mean and finite variance. Estimating equation (5), which takes the form of an
augmented Dickey-Fuller regression, then enables one to infer whether the per capita
incomes of the countries in the sample converge toward balanced growth paths. Given
convergence, one can also estimate how high each country’s balanced growth path is and
how rapidly convergence toward it occurs.
Andrew Bernard and Steven Durlauf (1995) have applied a variant of this
approach to data for individual countries, finding little evidence of convergence.
Unfortunately, time-series tests based on one or a few countries for sample periods of
even 100 years have little power to reject the null hypothesis of no convergence.
Substantial power can be obtained if data for a large number  C of countries are pooled
and the restrictions  r r r r 1 2 = = = ” L C , f f f 11 21 1 = = = L C , f f f 12 22 2 = = = L C ,
￿￿￿, f1p = f2p = ￿￿￿ = fCp are imposed. Doing so,  Nazrul Islam (1995) rejects the null8
hypothesis that  r = 0 at very small levels and estimates that the convergence rate is nearly
10 percent a year. Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996c) also reject the null hypothesis for
the labor and total factor productivities in a panel of 14 OECD countries.
Unfortunately, these restrictions can be easily rejected and imposing them
strongly affects the results; see Kevin Lee, Pesaran, and Ron Smith (1998). Following
Andrew Levin and  Chien-Fu Lin (1993), Georgios Karras and I (1996) used a procedure
that imposes only the restriction  r r r 1 2 = = = L C , also obtaining a strong rejection of  r
= 0. Although this restriction is valid under the null hypothesis that all the  rs are zero, the
Monte-Carlo simulations of G.S. Maddala and  Shaowen  Wu (1997) suggest that
appreciable size distortions can result from using this procedure. Finally, application of
the procedure of  Im, Pesaran, and Shin, which does not impose any of these restrictions,
yields little evidence that the  rs differ from zero; see Lee, Pesaran, and Smith.
The cross-sectional approach has been widely used for testing whether the per
capita incomes of regions converge toward their balanced growth paths and, if so, to
estimate how rapidly the convergence takes place.
3 Some examples are Barro and Xavier
Sala-i-Martin (1991; 1992a, 1992b; 1995,  Ch . 11) for regions of the United States,
Europe, and Japan; Damien  Neven  and Claudine  Gouyette  (1995) and Abraham  Filip  and
Paul Van  Rompuy  (1995) for regions of Europe; Elias  Carayannis  and  Rajiv  Mallick
(1996) for regions of Canada; and Helmut  Hofer  and Andreas  Worgotter  (1997) for
regions of Austria. This literature typically finds slow convergence not materially faster
than that found for countries. This finding is suspect for two reasons, however. First, the
estimates may to be severely biased for the reasons discussed above. Second, because the
theories that motivate the empirical work assume no labor mobility, the estimates may be
difficult to interpret if labor is in fact highly mobile across the regions. Although the
assumption of no labor mobility may be reasonable for countries, it is clearly
inappropriate for the regions within many countries. The next section works out the
implications of interregional labor mobility in some simple theoretical models.
                                                           
3 These questions have also been addressed using panel methods; e.g., Bernard and Jones (1996b) and
Evans and Karras (1996b). They report strong evidence in favor of convergence. Unfortunately, these
findings may be unreliable because parameter homogeneity is imposed.9
3. Theoretical Implications of Labor Mobility
Typically, the growth literature assumes closed economies. Although that assumption
might be defensible for countries, it is implausible for the regions within a country,
especially one like the US in which many factors are highly mobile and the barriers to
trade in goods and transportation costs are low.
The purpose of this section is to analyze growth within the regions of a country
characterized by a high degree of factor mobility. To that end, I assume that labor and
perhaps some other factors are costlessly mobile within a country consisting of  S regions.
Some or all of the goods produced in these regions may also be costlessly tradable
interregionally. Of course, not all factors and goods can be costlessly mobile since
regions would then cease to be well defined economically. I further assume that there are
more immobile factors than mobile factors and goods in each region. This assumption
prevents trade in factors and goods from equalizing the prices of the immobile factors
across the regions.
I assume that the value  Qst of the output produced in region  s during period  t is
related to the labor input  Nst and the vector  Xst of the other mobile inputs as follows:
4
(6) Qst = F( Nst,Xst;q st) ,
where  qst is a vector of region- and time-specific parameters. Differences in the
parameters in (6) reflect differences in inputs of immobile factors across regions and over
time as well as differences in product mix and the effects of changes in relative product
prices. The function  F( •) is assumed not only to be increasing in the mobile factor inputs
but also to be strictly concave. If it were convex instead, locating all of the mobile factors
in a single region would generally be optimal since marginal products would then be
nondecreasing in scale and one region would have higher productivity than the rest.
5
Because complete regional specialization is not observed, however, strict concavity must
therefore set in at some scale well short of the entire country’s supply of mobile factors.
6
                                                           
4 Of course, the vector  Xst may include physical capital.
5 Of course, costs of transport for either factors or goods can sustain  nonspecialization in the presence of a
moderate degree of convexity. See Paul  Krugman (1991) for an example.
6 Here I am defining  region broadly enough for the statement to hold. Agglomeration economies are well
known to be important in explaining the existence and size of cities.10
For simplicity, I assume strict concavity at every scale. Without loss of generality, I can
further assume that in equilibrium, the labor input in every region is positive.
Labor receives the same remuneration in every region by assumption. If labor is
also paid its marginal product, equation (6) implies that
(7) qst  ” Qst/Nst  =  wt/ast,
where  wt be the wage rate and  ast is the elasticity of the value of output with respect the
labor input in region  s during period  t. The elasticity  ast should be expected to vary across
regions because of differences in product mix and over time because of changes in either
relative prices or shifts in technologies. Equation (7) therefore implies that labor
productivity is likely to vary across regions even though labor is paid at the same rate
everywhere and to vary over time as well.
7
Let  yst be the logarithm of productivity and  yt  be the cross-regional mean of the
ysts. On the assumption that the elasticities  a a a 1 2 t t St , , , L  are covariance stationary, the
above analysis indicates that  y y y y y y t t t t St t 1 2 - - - , , , L  should also be covariance
stationary with nonzero means and positive finite variances.
8 Furthermore, the cross-
regional variance of the logarithm of labor productivity, defined by








should fluctuate around a positive mean with a positive finite variance.
Thus far, I have assumed that labor is costlessl y and immediately mobile. As a
result, labor always receives the same remuneration in every region. Suppose instead that
labor moves in response to differences in remuneration but the response is distributed
over time. Rather than modeling the movement of labor as the rational investment
activity of households subject to moving costs, I merely posit an  ad hoc adjustment
equation. Specifically, the labor input in each region adjusts according to
9
                                                           
7 These implications are similar to those of Jennifer  Roback (1982) in a similar model.
8 Jaume Ventura (1997) has formulated a growth model in which factor prices are equalized across regions.
His model implies that their labor productivities can appear to be converging even though growth in each
region is endogenous. This result stems in large part from the fact that elasticities  a1, a2, ￿￿￿, aS in the model
fall toward zero over time if the growth rates of the regions are bounded above zero. As a result, each
region’s share of wage income in the value of output also approaches zero. Because the wage share has not
shown any tendency to vanish in recorded history, this model is not a promising one for interpreting data.
9 An alternative formulation posits that  Dln(Nst/Nt) is proportional to the gap between the logarithm of the
wage rate region  s during period  t and the mean for all regions in the country. Olivier Blanchard and11
(9) D D D ln ln [ln (ln ln )], , , N N N N N st t st s t t = + - + £ £
*
- n n 1 0 1
where  N N N t t St 1 2
* * * , , , L  are the efficiency units of labor that would be employed in
regions 1, 2,  ￿￿￿, S, were labor instantaneously mobile and  Nt is the aggregate labor input.
The story underlying equation (9) is that  N N N st s t t
o ” - , exp( ln ) 1 D  workers find
themselves in region  s at the beginning of  t when wage rates are realized. (The growth
rate of each region’s labor input is assumed to be  DlnNt in the absence of migration.)  Nst
*
workers would choose to supply labor in region  s, were moving costless. The fixed cost
of moving differs across workers, leading some workers to move and others to stay. The
distribution of costs each period is assumed to be such that it always optimal to eliminate
a fraction  n of the gap between  ln N st
*  and  ln N st
o . Consequently, the larger the parameter
n is, the more rapidly labor migrates in response to regional shocks. So long as  n > 0,
however, labor is completely mobile in the long run in the sense that the mean of
ln ln N N st st -
*  is zero.
For simplicity, I assume that labor is the only mobile factor and that the elasticity
of output with respect to the labor input does not vary across regions or over time.
Therefore, the relationship (6) takes the Cobb-Douglas form
(10) Q N b a st st t st = + < <1
a a exp( ), , 0
where  a is the common value of the elasticity of output with respect to the labor input.
The quantity  bt+ ast is the total factor productivity of region  s during period  t. It is
decomposed into two terms, the first of which is  bt, the cross-regional mean. By




1  every period.  The second term  ast incorporates at least three
effects: the idiosyncratic changes in the supplies of the immobile factors in region  s; the
idiosyncratic changes in the efficiency of those factors induced by technological change;
and the idiosyncratic effects of changes in relative prices, given that regions have
different product mixes. I assume that  ast is difference stationary at worst.
On the assumption that labor is paid its marginal product,
a a
a a N b a N b a st t st t t t




1 exp( ) exp( )
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Lawrence Katz (1992) have shown that the implications of this formulation are similar to the one here. I
adopt equation (9) because it is more tractable and less  ad hoc than theirs .12
so that
(11) ln( / ) ( ) /( )
* N N a a st t st t 1 1 1
* = - -a .
Hence,
(12)  ln( t u N N /
* ) = 
a - 1
u a











since  N N jt t j
S *
= = ￿ 1 . Substituting equation (12) into equation (9) and rearranging
produces
(13)  ln( ) / t u N N = ln
1




















It then follows from  equations (13) and (10) that
(14) y y y y a st t s t t st - = - - + - - - ( )( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 1 n n D .
In the complete absence of mobility ( n = 0), equation (14) implies that  y y st t -  moves
one-for-one with the idiosyncratic shock to total productivity in region  s, exhibiting
exactly as much persistence as the shock itself. With some mobility (0 <  n < 1), the
contemporaneous effect of the idiosyncratic shock is shrunken by the factor 1- n, and the
persistence of its effect is less than its own. Indeed, even a permanent change in  ast
affects  y y st t -  only temporarily. With perfect mobility ( n = 1), the idiosyncratic shock
ceases to affect  y y st t -  even temporarily. Finally, so long as labor is perfectly mobile in
the long run ( n > 0),  y y st t -  should be mean stationary even if the idiosyncratic shocks
to total productivity in region  s are difference stationary.
Equation (14) has two other implications worth spelling out. First, the cross-
regional variance of the logarithm of output per worker has a constant mean around
which it fluctuates. As a result, one should not expect it to drift downward systematically
unless the parameters, which are here assumed to be constant, change systematically.
Second, the cross-regional variance is lower, the more mobile labor is. For example, if
every region’s idiosyncratic shock is a first-order autoregression with the autoregressive
parameter  p and innovation variance  y
2, the mean of the cross-regional variance is13
y p
2 2 1 /( ) -  when labor is completely immobile and 0 when labor is perfectly mobile.
10
Downward drift in the cross-regional variance therefore suggests increasing mobility of
factors over time.
At least since  Heckscher and  Ohlin, economists have widely appreciated that
trade in goods can be a substitute for trade in factors. Paul  Samuelson (1953) formalized
this intuition in his famous factor-price equalization theorem. It is reasonable , then, to
expect a reduction in barriers to trade or in transportation costs to have effects similar to
those of an increase in labor mobility. See Dan Ben-David (1993) for evidence
supporting this conjecture.
Ideally, one would like to test the above theories using measures of labor
productivity. In practice, one must typically use measures of per capita income instead.
Using the latter, however, raises two issues: households choose the per capita labor
supplied to the market; and they choose where to live. The endogeneity of the per capita
labor input creates no problem if its long-run supply is vertical. In that case, it fluctuates
around a constant mean along the balanced-growth path since the income and substitution
effects exactly cancel each other. By contrast, if its supply is not vertical, it diverges
across regions. I follow the literature here in assuming that its long-run supply is vertical
even though some fairly convincing evidence exists against the assumption; see Evans
and Karras (1997b).
The endogeneity of residence may also create problems. For example, suppose
that the supply of inputs can be completely divorced from the choice of where to live. In
that case, everyone might live in California but own labor and other factors located
elsewhere. Dividing the output produced in a given state by the number of individuals
residing there would then produce infinite values for every state except California. This
problem can be overcome by putting only the income received by the residents in the
numerator. The size of the resulting series, however, then partly reflects the effect of
income and wealth on the demand for regional amenities. For example, Florida and
Arizona, whose winters are warm, might attract relatively wealthy retirees and high-
income workers. In practice, however, individuals often live near where their inputs are
                                                           
10  The zero value is an artifact of the assumption that the  as are identical across regions and constant over
time as the first example considered above makes clear.14
supplied. Labor, by its very nature, requires the presence of its owner. For the most part,
the same is true of human capital. Physical capital may also tend to be supplied locally
since it is typically more productive when managed by its owner than when managed by
an employee. The evidence reported by  Gur  Huberman in this volume suggests that even
marketed claims to capital are overrepresented in the portfolios of households that live
near the underlying capital. Finally, if households are life-cycle savers, their assets
incomes should be cointegrated with their wage incomes. As a result, if per capita labor
income is stationary, per capita asset income is also stationary; see Evans and Karras
(1997a) for proof. All in all, then, the points made in this section are likely to apply to per
capita income as well as labor productivity.
I conclude this section with a discussion of the implications of the accumulation
of immobile reproducible factors. Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have shown
that the analysis of such accumulation is similar to its closed-economy counterpart if the
mobile factors experience diminishing returns in every region as is assumed here. In
particular, accumulation generates additional dynamics in  y y st t - . The additional
dynamics are more persistent, the more elastic the production functions are with respect
to these factors. Clearly, the dynamics are likely to be appreciably less persistent for
regions than for countries since the class of immobile reproducible factors is smaller for
the former than for the latter. Except for this last result, then, allowing for the
accumulation of immobile reproducible factors does not alter any of the conclusions of
this section.
4. Empirical Analysis for the US States
Many goods and factors have long been quite mobile across the US states; see  Sukkoo
Kim (1997). State data on per capita income should therefore prove useful in exploring
the ideas developed in section 2.
In carrying out this exploration, I use annual data on per capita factor income
(personal income less transfer payments) spanning the period 1929-1996 for each of the
contiguous US states.
11  I obtained the underlying data from a CD-Rom provided by the
                                                           
11  In an earlier paper, I also considered per capita personal income, per capita wage income, and per capita
asset income. The results were similar in all cases to those reported here.15
Bureau of Economic Analysis (RCN-0128) and from the  BEA’s web page. I have not
bothered to deflate the data since state-specific deflators are unavailable. (Deflating by a
common national price index would merely subtract the same value from both  yst and  yt
in  y y st t - .)
4.1 Is There Convergence?
I first investigate whether the per capita factor incomes of the contiguous US states
converge toward parallel balanced growth paths; i.e., whether  y y st t -  is mean stationary.
For this purpose, I employ the procedure formulated by  Im, Pesaran, and Shin. It entails
using ordinary least squares to fit equation (5) to the data for each state  s and then
calculating the following test statistic
(15) S s DF
s
S




and comparing it to the critical values from the standard normal distribution. In
expression (15),  $ t s is the t-ratio for the estimate of  rs, and mDF and  sDF are the mean and
standard deviation of the appropriate Dickey-Fuller distribution. A sufficiently negative
test statistic leads to rejection of the null hypothesis
H 0: (r1 = 0 ￿ r2 = 0 ￿￿￿￿￿ rS = 0) ￿( d1 = 0 ￿ d2 = 0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ dS = 0)
12
in favor of the alternative hypothesis
H 1: r1 < 0 ￿ r2 < 0 ￿￿￿￿￿ rS < 0.
13
The reason is that if H 0 is true, the t-ratios are independent of each other and each follows
a Dickey-Fuller distribution.
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the  t-ratios obtained by fitting equation (5)
to the logarithm of per capita factor income. For purposes of comparison, the last column
                                                           
12  I impose the condition that the  ds are all zero for two reasons. First, I think that it is highly implausible
that states can have endogenously different trend growth rates. Second, the resulting test is more
conservative than one that left the  ds unrestricted. This restriction still allows per capita incomes to diverge
across regions so long as they only wander apart rather than trend apart.
13  If any r is negative, all must be negative, and if any is zero, all must be zero; see my 1998 paper for
proof. In other words, H 1 is equivalent to  r1 < 0 ￿ r2 < 0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ rS < 0. Truth of H 0, however, does not rule
out the possibility that some proper subsets of the regions have per capita incomes, whose pairwise
logarithmic differences are stationary. To formulate a test for the presence of such subsets when no
evidence for H 1 can be found is a difficult statistical problem, well beyond the scope of this paper.
Fortunately, the issue is moot since H 0 can be readily rejected with the data analyzed here.16
of the table reports analogous statistics for the appropriate Dickey-Fuller distribution.
Clearly, the empirical distribution for the  t-ratios is shifted considerably to the left
relative to the Dickey-Fuller distribution. This result suggests a pronounced tendency of
the logarithm of every series to converge toward a common national trend. Formal
confirmation is provided by the test statistic, which is -6.64. The null hypothesis of
difference stationarity can therefore be rejected at any reasonable significance level.
14
4.2 How Rapid Is the Convergence?
Given the strong evidence for the convergence of the series toward a common trend, it
makes sense to estimate how rapidly the convergence takes place. Estimation of
convergence rates is complicated by two considerations, however. First, unless  y y st t -  is
a first-order autoregression (i.e.,  p = 0), yst’s convergence rate depends on the horizon
considered. I therefore focus on the asymptotic convergence rate, which prevails at
arbitrarily long horizons. It is 1- ls, where  ls is the dominant root of the polynomial
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In many applications, this measure provides an excellent approximation to the
convergence rates prevailing at horizons of more than one or two years since the other
dynamics die out quickly. Second, estimating the dominant root  ls merely by plugging
the ordinary least  squares estimates of  rs and the  fsis into (16) and solving for it yields a
strongly biased estimate. For example, the median bias is .064 for  ls = .97, T = 60, and  p
= 0 ; see Donald Andrews (1993, p. 148). One must therefore correct for the bias in some
fashion.
Using local-to-unity asymptotic distribution theory, James Stock (1991)
formulated a convenient method for doing so and for constructing confidence intervals.
Using this method, I calculated unbiased estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals of
the convergence rates for the per capita factor incomes of the contiguous US states.
Figure 1 plots these convergence rates, which are arranged in ascending order.
                                                           
14  Carlino and Mills (1993) have presented evidence that the parameters in equation (5) may have shifted
between the  interwar and postwar period. Because parameter instability biases unit-root tests against17
The estimated convergence rates average .1445 per year with a standard deviation
of .1472 per year. The confidence intervals are wide, typically including both negative
and very large positive values. Drawing strong inferences about the convergence rate of
any given state is thus unwarranted. It is nonetheless reasonable to claim that about a
quarter of the states have convergence rates of .2 or more. Furthermore, the uncertainty
about the mean of these convergence rates is considerably less than the uncertainty about
each state’s convergence rate. The central limit theorem suggests that the confidence
interval for the mean of the estimated convergence rates should be about  1 48 /  times as
wide as the average of the widths for the 48 individual states. The 90 percent confidence
interval for the mean of the convergence rates is therefore approximately (.1248 ,.1660).
Using the cross-sectional approach described in section 2, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) have estimated convergence rates for the US states of about
two percent a year, much smaller than what is reported in the previous paragraph. I obtain
similar estimates if I use their approach. For example, fitting equation (2) to the data and
using the same  xs as I employ in regression (21) below yields
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which implies a convergence rate of 2.32 percent a year.
15  I included the same  xs in
equation (17) as I found to be significant in equation (21) below.
16  My 1997b paper
shows that if the parameters of equation (5) do not vary across states and if  p = 0, then
(18) r = - + - 1 1 68 1
1 68 [ plim $ /( )]
/ h w ,
where  r is the true convergence rate, 68 is the number of years over which  Dy is
calculated,  $ h  is the ordinary least squares estimator of  h, and w ” cov( y
0,m|x)/var( y
0|x). A
consistent estimate of  w for the data at hand is .2018.
17  Plugging this value and the
                                                                                                                                                                                 
rejection of the null hypothesis, the evidence is thus even more resoundingly against the null hypothesis
than the analysis in the text would suggest.
15  This figure is 1-(1- .0117 ·68)
1/68 , where 68 is the number of years that the growth rate  Dy spans.
16  HEART is one for states in what I call the  heartland and zero for the other states;  MOUNT is one for
mountain states and zero for the other states; and  COL is the average fraction of the population 25 years or
older with at least four years of college in 1970, 1980, and 1990. The next subsection provides more detail.
17  Squaring the standard error of estimate of the ordinary least squares regression of  y
0 on an intercept,
HEART, MOUNT, and COL produces a consistent estimate of  var (y
0|x). Multiplying the square of the18
estimate of  h in the regression (17) into equation (18) results in a convergence rate of
8.91 percent a year. Unfortunately, this estimate of the true convergence rate cannot be
statistically distinguished from even 100 percent a year since plugging .2032 into
equation (18) in lieu of .2018 would result in  r = 1. (The difference between .2032 and
.2018 is not statistically significant at any conventional significance level.) Therefore,
cross-sectional regressions do not rule out even gigantic convergence rates.
4.3 What Affects Convergence Rates?
The characteristics of a state may affect its convergence rate. In particular, a state’s
convergence rate may depend on where it is and how well its population is educated. For
example,  Jess Benhabib and Mark Spiegel (1994) and Barro (1997) have argued that a
more schooled population is more easily able to adopt new technologies from other
regions and to transfer physical and human capital from low-return regions to high-return
regions.
I therefore regressed the convergence rate on five regional dummy variables
(HEART, SOUTH, PLAIN, MOUNT, and PACIF
18 ), the average fractions of the
population 25 and older with at least four years of high school ( HS) and at least four
years of college ( COL) in 1970, 1980, and 1990, and the average number of years of
schooling completed by this population ( SCH) in 1940, 1950, and 1960. After dropping
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standard error of estimate of equation (19) by the coefficient on  m in the regression of  y
0 on an intercept,
HEART, MOUNT, COL, and m  produces a consistent estimate of  cov( y
0,m|x). The arithmetic is
1.251(.1014/ .2524)
2 = .2018.
18  HEART is one for Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and zero otherwise ; SOUTH is one for Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia and zero otherwise;  PLAIN is one for Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and South Dakota and zero otherwise;  MOUNT is one for Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah and zero otherwise; and  PACIF is one for California, Oregon,
and Washington. The excluded states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Vermont.19
where  $ rs  is the estimated convergence rate of state  s and the figures in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Not surprisingly, the estimates indicate that
southern states tend to have lower convergence rates than other states. States in which
large fractions of the population have four years of high school but not four years of
college also tend to have low convergence rates. This result is inconsistent with those
reported by  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Barro (1997) for samples of countries.
4.4 How Far Apart Are State Balanced Growth Paths?
The relative height of state  s’s balanced growth path can be measured by the
unconditional mean of  y y st t - . The standard deviation of these means across the US
states is thus a reasonable measure of how far apart their balanced growth paths are.
Equation (5) implies that  ms, the unconditional mean of  y y st t - , takes the form
(20) ms ” -ds/rs.
It can therefore be estimated by using ordinary least squares to fit equation (5) to the data
for state s and plugging the resulting estimates of  ds and  rs into equation (20). Carrying
out these  calculations yields estimated means with a cross-state standard deviation of
.1580. Thus, the balanced growth paths for factor income are rather far apart.
The  mss may depend on the states’ characteristics. I therefore  regressed the  ms on
the same variables as I did for the convergence rates. After dropping insignificant
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This regression indicates that per capita factor income tends to be higher in the heartland
and lower in the mountain states than elsewhere. This finding may reflect the prevalence
of manufacturing in the former and extractive industries in the latter. A college-educated
population is also associated with higher per capita factor incomes. Each  one percent of
the population with four years of college adds about three percent. The size of the high-
school population and years of schooling do not appear to have a separate effect,
however. Interestingly, after adjusting for the size of the college-educated population, the
South does not appear to have unusually low values of per capita factor income. Of20
course, in interpreting this regression, one should realize that the coefficient on  COL
could just as well reflect causation running from per capita factor income to schooling as
the other way.
4.5 How Does the Cross-State Variance Evolve over Time?
Another way of investigating whether the per capita incomes of the contiguous US states
converge toward parallel balanced growth paths is to examine how the cross-state
variance of  yst evolves over time.
19  If y y st t -  is covariance stationary for every state  s,








is also covariance stationary. In particular, it fluctuates around a constant positive mean.
By contrast, under H 0, V is difference stationary with a positive drift rate; for proof, see
my 1996 paper. The latter result is most easily seen when  y y st t - is a driftless random
walk in each region. In that case,
(23) V V u t S s
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where  ss is the standard deviation of  ust. Putting these results together, one can assert that
V has the representation
20
(24) D D V V V t t i t i i t = + + + - - ￿ k g y e 1 ,
where  et is an independently and identically distributed zero-mean error term with a
positive finite variance and  k, g, and the  ys are parameters such that  k > 0 and
- < £ 2 0 g . The null hypothesis holds if  g = 0, and the alternative hypothesis holds if  g <
0. Note that  V cannot fall indefinitely since it must be either stationary around a constant
positive mean or nonstationary and upward trending.
                                                           
19  Danny Quah (1996) has used a related approach in which the cross-sectional distribution of per capita
income is  discretized and the intertemporal transitions between the points of the distribution are modeled as
Markovian. This approach permits a richer description of how the cross-sectional distribution evolves over
time than can be obtained from examining just the cross-sectional variance. Unfortunately, it presupposes
covariance stationary , thereby ruling out the hypothesis testing carried out below.
20  If the ds differ from zero as they would if the growth rates of states were endogenous, a linear time trend
would also appear in equation (24). Its slope coefficient would be positive under the null hypothesis and
zero under the alternative hypothesis. See my 1996 paper for proof.21
Under the null hypothesis, the  t-ratio for the least-squares estimator of  g
converges in distribution to standard normal since  k > 0. Furthermore, it diverges to - ¥
under the alternative hypothesis. Thus, a sufficiently negative  t-ratio permits the null
hypothesis to be rejected. For the sample sizes encountered in practice, however, the
finite-sample distribution is intermediate between the Dickey-Fuller and standard normal
distributions. As the ratio of  k to the standard deviation of  et rises from zero to infinity,
the finite-sample distribution passes from the former to the latter. For example, the .05
critical values of the distribution with  T = 66 are –2.913, -2.232, -1.882, -1.754, and
-1 645 .  for ratios of 0, .4, 1.0, 2.5, and  ¥. Therefore, if this ratio is known, Monte Carlo
simulations can be used to obtain appropriate critical values.
Calculating an approximation to the ratio is straightforward. Suppose that  ust can
be adequately represented as normal with identical variances  s
2 across the regions. In that
case,  k = s
2 and  ust
2 2 /s  is distributed as  c
2(1), which has a mean of one and a variance
of two. Hence, given independence across the regions, the variance of  et is 2s
4/S, and the
ratio in question is  S /2 .
Figure 2 plots the cross-state variance of the logarithm of per capita factor
income. Two features of the plot are noteworthy: innovations to the variance appear to
dissipate quickly, and the variance has  fallen a great deal over the sample period. The
first observation suggests strong mean reversion, while the latter indicates that factor
mobility has increased over time, thereby shifting the data generating process toward
either faster convergence or less regional heterogeneity of immobile factors. If such
changes have indeed taken place, assuming that equations (5) and (24) hold over the
entire sample period with unchanged parameters is problematical. Such parameter
instability decreases the likelihood of finding evidence of mean reversion, however. For
this reason, the evidence for rapid convergence is even stronger than it would appear to
be on first blush.
21
                                                           
21  A fall in the variance resulting from structural shifts is not “convergence” in the sense that the term is
used in this paper. Convergence implies that only about half the changes in  V lower it unless initial
conditions somehow place it far from its mean.  De novo, it would be better to use “reversion” to refer to the
tendency to approach balanced growth paths and “convergence” to refer to the effects of structural shifts
like increasing mobility or decreasing transportation costs and trade barriers. The dead hand of past usage,
however, makes this distinction more confusing than clarifying.22
Pretesting revealed that one lag suffices to fit the data. The result from using
ordinary least squares to fit equation (24) is
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The  t-ratio for the estimate of  g is –2.74. A Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000
iterations revealed that the .01 critical value of this test statistic is approximately –2.427.
The evidence for convergence of the factor incomes of the contiguous US states to
parallel growth paths is therefore strong. This finding confirms the other results of this
section.
5. Comparison with Countries
It is instructive to compare the results reported in the previous section for US states with
those that the literature has obtained for countries. As pointed out in section 2 ,  there is
little evidence for convergence across large groups of countries. If convergence is
nonetheless accepted as given, my 1997b paper provides comparable estimates of
convergence rates for 48 countries. The estimated convergence rates for most of these
countries have wide confidence intervals, extending from somewhat negative values to
substantial positive values. The mean of these estimates is 5.89 percent a year with a 90
percent confidence interval extending from 3.93 percent a year to 8.58 percent a year.
22
The convergence rates for the US states are therefore likely to be much larger than the
convergence rates for these countries. A natural interpretation is that factor mobility is
much higher across US states than it is across countries. In addition, the relative lack of
barriers to trade in goods and the relatively low transportation costs within the US may
play an important role. See the evidence reported in this volume by Antonio  Fatas and
Holger Wolf, which indicates that factors are much more mobile and trade barriers are
much lower between  US states than between countries.
Mean cross-country differences in log per capita income are much larger for
countries than for US states. The standard deviation of the  ms for the 48 countries in the
sample for my 1997b paper is .9900, which is gigantic compared to .1580 for the per
                                                           
22  Indeed, the evidence that convergence occurs at all is largely confined to rich countries.  See my 1996 and
1998 papers.23
capita factor incomes of the contiguous US states. No doubt the low degree of
international factor mobility and the high degree of interstate factor mobility in the US
are key determinants of this difference.
In order to assess how schooling affects convergence rates and the levels of the
balanced growth paths for per capita income, I  regressed them on  SEC, the average
enrollment rate in secondary schools between 1950 and 1990.























Unlike for the states, the convergence rates appear to be insensitive to schooling. By
contrast, schooling appears to be an important determinant of the  ms for both countries
and states. Interestingly, dummy variables for Latin America, Asia, and Africa, which by
themselves are highly significant in a regression for  $ m c , are completely insignificant
after controlling for schooling.
6. Conclusions
The per capita factor incomes of the contiguous US states show a pronounced tendency to
converge toward parallel balanced growth paths. Furthermore, the convergence is rapid
on average, though the estimated convergence rates are widely dispersed across the states
and quite imprecisely estimated for each individual state. Theory suggests that this rapid
convergence results from the high factor mobility within the United States, though the
absence of interstate barriers to trade in goods and low transportation costs may also play
an important role. Notwithstanding the high factor mobility, differences in per capita
income across the states are substantial. This result, however, is not surprising since the
                                                           
23  The countries included in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. My 1997b paper details the sources of the data on real GDP per
worker and  SECc.24
economies of the states are quite heterogeneous. With such heterogeneity, per capita
incomes would not be equalized even if all factor prices were equalized.
The per capita incomes of broad groups of countries show no pronounced
tendency to converge toward balanced growth paths. To the extent that convergence does
takes place, it is fairly slow on average. As was true for the states, the estimated
convergence rates are widely dispersed across the countries and estimated with
considerable imprecision for each individual country. Theory suggests that this fairly
slow, or even nonexistent, convergence results from the virtual absence of labor mobility
across national frontiers and perhaps from low capital mobility, barriers to trade in goods,
and significant transportation costs. Finally, differences in labor productivity across
countries are gigantic, greatly exceeding those across the contiguous US states. No doubt
the absence of labor mobility accounts for the lion’s share of these differences, though
the heterogeneity of the economies of the countries probably also exceeds that of the
states.
These results suggest that the movement toward unified markets in goods and
factors in Europe should lead the per capita incomes of the individual countries to
converge toward parallel balanced growth paths if they do not already do so. Moreover,
to the extent that they do, the rates at which the convergence takes place should increase,
the balanced growth paths should be pulled toward each other, and the cross-sectional
variance of the logarithms of per capita income should fall.25
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Table 1. Real Per Capita GDP for Country Groups
in 1990  Geary-Khamis Dollar
Country Group 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1992
Western Europe 1292 2110 3704 5123 12288 17384
Western Offshoots 1205 2440 5237 9255 16075 20850
Southern Europe 806 1111 1753 2025 6029 8273
Eastern Europe 750 1030 1557 2604 5742 4608
Latin America 715 800 1515 2614 4750 5294
Asia 550 580 742 727 1680 3239
Africa 450 480 575 792 1274 1318
Source. Table E-3 of  Maddison (1995).
Table 2. Growth Rates of Real Per Capita GDP
for Country Groups in Percent per Year
Country Group 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1992
Western Europe 0.98 1.31 0.88 3.80 1.83
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.78 1.54 2.40 1.37
Southern Europe 0.64 1.06 0.39 4.74 1.67
Eastern Europe 0.79 0.97 1.38 3.44 -1.16
Latin America 0.22 1.49 1.47 2.60 0.57
Asia 0.11 0.57 -0.05 3.64 3.46
Africa 0.13 0.42 0.87 2.07 0.18
Source. Derived from data in Table 1 above.30
Table 3. Summary Statistics on the  t-Ratios
for the Contiguous U.S. States
Statistic Sample Dickey-Fuller Distribution
Mean -2.250 -1.528
Standard Deviation   0.837   0.866
5
th Percentile -3.994 -2.911
10
th Percentile -3.779 -2.597
25
th Percentile -2.878 -2.088
50
th Percentile -2.286 -1.554
75
th Percentile -1.702 -0.992
90
th Percentile -1.275 -0.413
95
th Percentile -0.903 -0.042
Notes. A common lag length ( p) of three years was chosen for each state. Pretesting indicated that this
choice is adequate. Estimation was by ordinary least squares over the sample period 1933-1996. A Monte-
Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 iterations estimated the values reported in the last column.31
Figure 1. Median Estimates and 90% Confidence Intervals











Figure 2. Cross-State Variance
of Log Per Capita Factor Income, 1929-1996
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